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Abstract
Based on Ono (2010), this short note presents consideration of the consumption tax and examines
how tax reform to maintain the neutrality of pension benet aects income growth rate and the
employment rate. A decrease in the contribution rate of workers with an increase in consumption
tax raises employment, but the eect on income growth is ambiguous. A decrease in the contribution
rate of rms with an increase in consumption tax decreases the employment and facilitates income
growth.
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1 Introduction
This paper presents examination of how a government should collect revenue for pension benets. As
shown in Table.1, some dierences exist in burden sharing among workers, rms, and governments in
some OECD countries. In Japan, the contribution rate of pensions continues to increase and the national
government burden sharing of basic pensions was raised from one-third to one-half in 2009. Because
of this increased national government burden, the consumption tax rate in Japan was raised from 5%
to 8% in 2014. However, this pension reform does not change the level of pension benets. Why does
the government consider a consumption tax? The answer derives from Japan's characteristic aging
society with fewer children. In this society, the total revenue to provide the pension benet decreases or
the burden of the workers per capita must continue increasing because of a decrease in the number of
workers. This is not a sustainable pension system. However, with the consumption tax, not only workers
but also older people pay a consumption tax. Thereby, the government can collect sucient revenues to
provide pension benets.
[Insert Table. 1 around here.]
Based on the Ono (2010) model setting, this short note presents examination of the eect of an increase
in consumption tax instead of a decrease in the contribution rate of the workers or rms to maintain a
pension benet, on the employment rate and the income growth rate. Ono (2010) describes consideration
of the contribution rate of the workers and the rms and examines how the means to nance pension
benets aect the employment rate and the income growth rate in the overlapping generations model
with unemployment caused by labor unions. Results of this short paper show that a decrease in the
contribution rate of workers with an increase in consumption tax raises employment. However, the eect
on the income growth is ambiguous. If the government decreases the contribution rate of the rms and
increases the consumption tax, then employment decreases and income growth increases. These results
imply how the government should collect the revenues to fund pension benets.
Some studies derive how the pension policy aects income growth. Wigger (1999) describes that a
pay-as-you-go pension reduces the income growth rate. However, Yoon and Talmain (2001) demonstrate
that income growth in a pay-as-you-go pension system is greater than that in the fully funded system.
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A decrease in the contribution rate can raise the income growth rate. Then the pension benet can be
pulled up, as derived by Fanti and Gori (2010). Lin and Tian (2003) report that the consumption tax to
nance pension benets reduces the capital stock per capita in a model with an endogenous labor supply
and population growth. Although no report of the relevant literature explains how the consumption
tax aects the employment rate in the case of the neutrality of pension benet, this tax reform should
be examined because the government in Japan reformed the pension system as described above. The
remainder of this paper consists of the following. Section 2 explains the model settings. Section 3 derives
the equilibrium. Section 4 presents examination of the eect of pension reform on the employment and
the income growth. The nal section concludes this paper.
2 Model
This model economy includes agents of four types: households, rms, government and labor union. This
section explains the model settings.
2.1 Household
Individuals live in two periods: young and old periods. My paper presents consideration of an overlapping
generations model. A young generation and old generation exist in each period. The household utility
function Ut is assumed by the following log utility function as
Ut =  ln c1t + (1  ) ln c2t+1; 0 <  < 1: (1)
In that equation, c1t and c2t+1 respectively denote consumption by young and old people. t signies the
period. In the young period, younger people work inelastically to gain wage income, which is allocated
into the consumption in the young period and to savings that must be consumed during the old period.
However, this paper presents consideration of unemployment: some young people can work; others cannot
work because of a lack of available jobs. The government imposes a tax burden to provide pension benets
for older people and the benet for unemployment. Then, the household's lifetime budget constraint of
worker is shown below.
(1 + c)c1t +
(1 + c)c2t+1
1 + rt+1
= (1  l   )wt + Pt+11 + rt+1 : (2)
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In that equation, 1 + rt+1 and wt respectively denote an interest rate and a wage rate. l (0 < l < 1)
denotes the labor income tax rate (contribution rate of workers) to nance for pension benet Pt+1. 
(0 <  < 1) denotes the tax rate for unemployment benet. c (0 < c) denotes the consumption tax
rate for pension benet.
If households are unemployed, then they can obtain unemployment benet ut. Income taxation l, 
for pension benets and unemployment are exempted. Then, the budget constraint of the unemployed
household is shown as
(1 + c)c1t +
(1 + c)c2t+1
1 + rt+1
= ut +
Pt+1
1 + rt+1
; 0 <  < 1: (3)
An unemployed household is assumed to obtain a pension benet during the old period that is less than
Pt+1 because of 0 <  < 1. This pension setting is the same as that described by Ono (2010).1
With (1) and (2), the optimal allocations of workers, cw1t and c
w
2t+1 are derived as
cw1t =

1 + c

(1  l   )wt + Pt+11 + rt+1

; (4)
cw2t+1 =
(1  )(1 + rt+1)
1 + c

(1  l   )wt + Pt+11 + rt+1

: (5)
With (1) and (3), the optimal allocations of unemployment, cu1t and c
u
2t+1 are derived as
cu1t =

1 + c

ut +
Pt+1
1 + rt+1

; (6)
cu2t+1 =
(1  )(1 + rt+1)
1 + c

ut +
Pt+1
1 + rt+1

: (7)
2.2 Firm
Firms produce nal goods with capital stock and labor input in a perfectly competitive market. The
product function is assumed as
Yt = Kt (AtLt)
1 ; 0 <  < 1: (8)
Therein, Yt denotes the nal goods. Kt and Lt denote the capital stock and the labor input in t period.
At denotes the labor productivity, which is assumed as At  aKtLt (0 < a).2 As shown by Ono (2010), this
paper assumes that the government levies a wage-based tax burden for the rms at the rate (contribution
1In Japan, employed households are exempted from paying the pension premium. However, the pension benet that one
can obtain in the old period is less than the pension benet of the household that is not unemployed in the young period.
2Romer (1986) sets the endogenous growth model with externality of physical capital. Grossman and Yanagawa (1993)
specify the externality of physical capital such as At = a
Kt
Lt
.
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rate of the rms) of f (0 < f < 1) because of the pension benet for older people. Then, the rm's
prot t is given as
t = Kt (AtLt)
1    (1 + f )wtLt   (1 + rt)Kt: (9)
Given At and maximizing the rm's prot (9) in a competitive market, demand for the physical capital
stock and labor input is
wt =
(1  )A1 t Kt L t
1 + f
; (10)
1 + rt = K 1t (AtLt)
1 : (11)
Presumably, the physical capital stock is fully depreciated in a single period.
2.3 Government
The government provides not only the pension benet for elderly people but also benets to compensate
for unemployment. The pension benet for older people is nanced by taxation for workers and rms.
Then, assuming a balanced budget, the budget constraint for the pension benet for older people is
Pt+1Lt+Pt+1(N Lt) = (l+f )wt+1Lt+1+c (Ltcw1t + (N   Lt)cu1t + Lt 1cw2t + (N   Lt 1)cu2t) ; (12)
where N denotes the total population of younger people, which is assumed to be constant over time.
Furthermore, Lt and N  Lt respectively denote the population size of workers and of unemployment. If
the unemployment benet is given by the balanced budget, then the following equation is obtained:
(N   Lt)ut = wtLt: (13)
2.4 Labor Union
This model includes a labor union. The labor union cares not only about the household lifetime income of
workers, but also their unemployment. The labor union chooses wage rate wt to maximize the following
function as considered by Ono (2010) subject to the labor demand function (10).3
Vt = Lt

(1  l   )wt + Pt+11 + rt+1

+ (N   Lt)

ut +
Pt+1
1 + rt+1

: (14)
3Some studies have examined the labor union to bring about unemployment. Ono (2010) sets the model by which
the labor union cares about the lifetime income of a household with employed and unemployed members. Corneo and
Marquardt (2000) consider a Nash negotiation solution within the wage rate and unemployment rate. Daveri and Tabellini
(2000) assume the objective function of a labor union that includes only the income in the younger period. Then, because
no pension benet is considered, the eect of pension benet caused by the policy does not exist.
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The labor union maximizes the objective function Vt subject to the labor demand (10). Then, substituting
(10) into (14)?the wage rate wt to maximize Vt is derived as
wt =
ut   (1 )Pt+11+rt+1
(1  )(1  l   ) : (15)
Considering (10) and (15), the population of workers Lt is determined. Then, the population of unem-
ployed workers N   Lt is obtainable as well.
3 Equilibrium
Considering A  aKtLt , the wage rate and interest rate are derived as
wt =
(1  )a1 
1 + f
Kt
Lt
; (16)
1 + rt = a1 : (17)
The interest rate is constant over time. The aggregate output is derived as Yt = a1 Kt. Then, an
increase in capital stock represents the income growth. Aggregate household's saving is given as St 
Lts
w
t +(N  Lt)sut , where swt  (1  l )wt  (1+ c)cw1t and sut  ut  (1+ c)cu1t respectively represent
the savings of workers and unemployed people. Considering (4) and (6), set and s
u
t are shown as
swt = (1  )(1  l   )wt  
Pt+1
1 + rt+1
;
sut = (1  )ut  
Pt+1
1 + rt+1
: (18)
Then, aggregate saving St and the capital market clearing condition Kt+1 = St are reduced to
Kt+1
Kt
 1 + g = (1  )a
1 (1  )(1  l)
1 + f
  N
1 + r
Pt+1
Kt
((1  )lt + ); (19)
where lt  LtN and 1  lt respectively denote the employment rate and the unemployment rate. For given
Kt, the capital stock Kt+1 and the income growth rate 1 + g are determined as (19). Substituting (16)
into (15), the employment rate lt is given to support the following equation.
(1  )(1  l   )
lt
=

1  lt  
(1 + f )(1  )Pt+1
(1  )a1 (1 + r)Kt (20)
In that equation, Pt+1 depends on employment rate lt. For givenKt, the employment rate lt is determined.
Dening L and R as the left-hand-side and right-hand-side of (20), respectively, we can consider the
following gure; we obtain the unique lt.
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[Insert Fig.1 around here.]
Without a consumption tax, the income growth rate is derived as the simple form of
1 + g =
(1 )(1 )a1 (1 l)
1+f
1 + (1 )a
1 (l+f )
(1+r)(1+f )
: (21)
Without a consumption tax,
(1  )(1  l   )
lt
1 lt
+
(1  )(l + f )(1 + g)
1 + r
1
lt
1 lt + 
=  (22)
can be obtained. lt is given to satisfy this equation. We nd unique lt between 0 and 1.
4 Pension Reform
This paper presents examination of the introduction of consumption tax to nance the pension benet
to support the pension benet level. The pension reform considered in this paper raises the consumption
tax c and reduces the labor income tax rate l or the contribution rate for rm f .
4.1 Decrease in the labor income tax rate
This subsection presents consideration of the pension reform to introduce consumption tax c and to
decrease the labor income tax rate l: the contribution rate of workers. From total dierentiation of (20)
with respect to l and lt at the approximation of c = 0 for given Kt, the sign of dltdl is expressed as
dlt
dl
=   1  
lt
(1 lt)2 +
(1 )(1 l )
lt
< 0: (23)
This negative sign signies that a decrease in l with an increase in c raises the employment rate lt and
decreases the unemployment rate for any Kt. How does this tax reform aect the income growth rate
1+ g? Total dierentiation of (19) with respect to l, c, lt and g at the approximation of c = 0, dgdl are
derived as
dg
dl
=   (1  )a
1 (1  )
1 + f
  (l + f )(1  )(1  )(1 + g)
(1 + f )((1  )lt + )
dlt
dl
: (24)
The sign of dgdl is ambiguous. The following proposition can be established.
Proposition 1 A pension reform that decreases the labor income tax rate and increases the consump-
tion tax rate to maintain a pension benet raises the employment rate. However, the eect on income
growth rate is ambiguous.
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A decrease in the labor tax rate l raises the workers' disposable income (1 l )wt, which is pulled
up for given wt. Then, the labor union allows a decrease in wage rate wt because the worker's disposable
income rises. Then, a decrease in the wage rate raises the labor demand shown by (16). Therefore, the
employment rate rises.
The eect of pension reform on the income growth is ambiguous because both a positive eect and the
negative eect exist. A decrease in l raises household saving, which raises income growth. However, this
pension reform raises the employment rate and reduces aggregate household saving because the aggregate
pension benet in the old period increases.
4.2 Decrease in Contribution Rate of the Firm
This subsection presents an examination of how a decrease in the contribution rate of the rm with
an increase in consumption tax does not change the pension benet. Total dierentiation of (20) with
respect to lt and f at the approximation of c = 0, the sing of dltdf is derived as
dlt
df
=
(1 )(1+g)(f+l)
(1+f )(lt+(1 lt))
(1 )(1 l )
l2t
+ (1 lt)2
> 0: (25)
A decrease in f reduces employment. From total dierentiation of (19) with respect to f , one can derive
c, lt, and g at the approximation of c = 0, dgdf as
dg
df
=   (1  )a
1 (1  )(1  l)
(1 + f )2
  (l + f )(1  )(1  )(1 + g)
(1 + f )((1  )lt + )
dlt
df
< 0: (26)
Then, the following proposition is established.
Proposition 2 A decrease in the contribution rate of rms with an increase in consumption tax reduces
the employment rate and raises the income growth rate.
As shown by (16), a decrease in the contribution rate of rms f raises the wage rate. Then, the labor
demand decreases. Considering (19), the eect on income growth is explainable. A decrease in f directly
raises income growth as shown by the rst term of (19). However, a decrease in lt with a decrease in f
reduces the aggregate pension ((1  )lt + )Pt+1 and raises the income growth, as shown by the second
term of (19).
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5 Conclusions
This short note presented examination of how the government should use the consumption tax or not
in pension reform. As described herein, a decrease in the contribution rate of rms with an increase
in consumption tax raises unemployment even if income growth increases. However, a decrease in the
contribution rate of workers with an increase in consumption tax reduces unemployment. Nevertheless,
income growth is not always pulled up. Although the consumption tax is considered to be caused by a
decrease in intergenerational inequality in an aging society with fewer children, this policy might bring
about new problems such as a decrease in income growth or an increase in unemployment.
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Appendix
Derivation of (15)
Substituting (10) into (14) and calculating dVtdwt , we obtain (15) as
dVt
dwt
=
 
(1  )A1 t
1 + f
! 1

Kt

(1  ) (1  l   )w 
1

t  
1

Pt+1
1 + rt+1
w
  1 1
t

+
1

 
(1  )A1 t
1 + f
! 1

Ktw
  1 1
t

ut +
Pt+1
1 + rt+1

= 0;
(   1)(1  l   )w 
1

t  
Pt+1
1 + rt+1
w
  1 1
t + w
  1 1
t

ut +
Pt+1
1 + rt+1

= 0;
  (1  )(1  l   )wt = Pt+11 + rt+1   ut  
Pt+1
1 + rt+1
:
Derivation of (23)
From total dierentiation of (20) with respect to lt, l and Pt+1, we obtain the following equation,
 1  
lt
dl   (1  )(1  l   )
l2t
dlt =

(1  lt)2 dlt  
(1 + f )(1  )N
(1  )a1 (1 + r)Kt dPt+1:
Given for Kt and noting that dPt+1 = 0 because this paper presents consideration of that the level of
pension benet Pt+1 does not change, we obtain (23).
Derivation of (24)
From total dierentiation of (19) with respect to g, lt, l and Pt+1, we obtain
dg =   
1 + r
NPt+1
Kt
(1  )dlt   (1  )a
1 (1  )
1 + f
dl   N1 + r
(1  )lt + 
Kt
dPt+1:
Noting that dPt+1 = 0 and
NPt+1
Kt
= (l+f )(1 )a
1 (1+g)
(1+f )((1 )lt+) , we obtain (24).
Derivation of (25)
From total dierentiation of (20) with respect to lt, f and Pt+1, we obtain
  (1  )(1  l   )
l2t
dlt =

(1  lt)2 dlt  
(1  )Pt+1N
(1  )a1 (1 + r)Kt df  
(1 + f )(1  )N
(1  )a1 (1 + r)Kt dPt+1:
Noting that dPt+1 = 0, we obtain (25).
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Derivation of (26)
From total dierentiation of (19) with respect to g, lt, f and Pt+1,
dg =   (1  )a
1 (1  )(1  l)
(1 + f )2
df   N1 + r
(1  )lt + 
Kt
dPt+1   N1 + r
Pt+1(1  )
Kt
dlt:
Noting that dPt+1 = 0, we obtain (26).
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Japan U.S.A. U.K. Germany France Sweden
Contribution Rate 18.3% 12.4% 25.8% 18.7% 17.45% 17.21%
(Worker) 9.15% 6.2% 12.0% 9.35% 7.15% 7.0%
(Firm) 9.15% 6.2% 13.8% 9.35% 10.3% 10.21%
Government Burden Share * 0% 0% 27.3% 36.5% **
Table 1 Pension Systems in Some OECD Countries.
*: Japan government burden share is half of the basic pension. **: Sweden government burden is
only for guaranteed pensions. (Data: Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare)
lt
L;R
0 1
R
L
Figure 1 Unique Solution of lt.
13
